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THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: AN ACTIVE
ENFORCER OF FREEDOM, OR A PASSIVE PLAYER

IN THE EC GAME?
DIMPLE

D.

DHABALiA*

In an ordered society of mankind, there is no such thing as unrestricted liberty, either of nations or of individuals. Liberty itself is the
product of restraints; it is inherently a composite of restraints; it dies
when restraints are withdrawn. Freedom... is not an absence of restraints; it is a composite of restraints. There is no liberty without order. There is no order without systematized restraint. Restraints are
the substance without which liberty does not exist. They are the essence of liberty.1

I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the European Community's (EC) efforts in moving towards
a more united Europe through its fusion of several economic and political institutions and policies, the EC has failed to implement any structure to protect the fundamental freedoms accorded to each individual,
thereby raising concerns about continued European unity, national sovereignty, and jurisdiction. 2 One of the main foundations of international law, the UN Charter (the Charter), "contains two basic axioms
which may sometimes come into conflict." 3 First, the Charter ensures
each State its sovereign equality as well as its territorial integrity. At
the same time, however, "there is the aim of promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."4 In most
J.D. candidate, University of Denver Law School, 2000. I would like to thank my family for their unconditional love and support in every challenge I undertake. I would also
like to thank Martha Keister, without whom, this paper would never have taken shape.
1. E. Barrett Prettyman, retired Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, in a speech at
Law Day Observances, 1962, at the Pentagon, quoted in Case and Comment, MarchApril, 1963, 26.
2. See Tara C. Stever, Protecting Human Rights in the European Union: An Argument for Treaty Reform, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 919 (1997).
3. S. D. Bailey, The Security Council, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 304 (P.H. Alston ed., 1992), quoted in Peter R. Baehr, The Security
Council and Human Rights, in THE DYNAMICS OF THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EUROPE 15 (Rick Lawson ed., 1994).
4. Id.
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instances however, States will refer to Article 2, section 7 of the Charter, which supports the first axiom, to "prevent the effective implementation of the latter. 5
Because the EC Member States are also members of the UN, each
State has a right to assert its sovereignty.6 However, all Member States
are signatories to the European Community Treaty (EC Treaty) and
most States are signatories to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 7 Both of these documents, as well as European case
law, explicitly refer to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) "by which
all Member States have consented to be bound."8 However, because
there is no formal written Bill of Rights for the Community incorporating the Convention into Community law, some States adhere to the
Convention and other States do not. 9 Although the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) has taken to regularly referring to the Convention in its
decisions, States continue to dispute the Court's jurisdiction.
Unlike most national constitutions, the EC Treaty explicitly fails to
catalog the "fundamental rights and freedoms upon which citizens can
rely against the governmental authorities."' 1o The ECJ attempts to protect these fundamental rights by "classifying them as general principles
of Community law, referring to the common constitutional traditions of
the Member States and to international instruments, in particular the
Convention."'1 Since the Court has held that Member States are to consider fundamental rights as a part of Community "law" as suggested by
Article 164 of the EC Treaty, 12 the ECJ must attempt to ensure that the
individual Member States as well as the Community as a whole, honor
13
fundamental rights.
This case-note will demonstrate that by denying itself the jurisdiction to guide individual Member States in interpreting the conformity of
national laws to Community laws, the ECJ is failing to protect the fundamental freedoms of the EC citizens. This paper is divided into three

5. Id.
6. See generally U.N. CHARTER, art. 73.

7. See generally TREATY OF ROME, Mar. 25, 1957, [1957] 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1957)
[hereinafter EC TREATY]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976).
8. See also G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the
Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 169,
175 (1995).
9. See Stever, supranote 2, at 957.
10. Inge Bernaerts, Opinion 2/94, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 372, 372 (1996).
11. See id.
12. Article 164 of the EC Treaty states, 'The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the
interpretation and application of this Treaty, the law is observed." EC TREATY, supra
note 7, art. 164.
13. Bernaerts, supranote 10, at 372.
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sections. First, an examination of the case of Kremzow v. Republik
Osterreich. Next, an in-depth analysis of the prior legal authority the
ECJ incorporated into its decision. Finally, a discussion regarding the
implications of the ECJ's decision.
II. FRIEDRICHKREMZOW V. REPUBLIK OSTERREICH-A
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

In December of 1982, Friedrich Kremzow, a retired Austrian judge,
confessed to the murder of an Austrian lawyer, a statement he later retracted. 14 In December of 1984, the District Court found Kremzow
guilty of murder and the unlawful possession of a firearm and sentenced him to twenty years in a mental institution. 15 Kremzow appealed to the Supreme Court of Austria regarding the lower court's sentence. The Supreme Court, in a hearing during which Kremzow was
absent, upheld the lower court's finding of Kremzow's guilt, however,
the Court changed the twenty-year sentence in a mental institution to
16
life imprisonment in a civilian prison.
At his appeals hearing, Kremzow argued that his fundamental
right to freedom of movement was at stake.1 7 Historically, scholars
have regarded freedom of movement only in the context of economics,
and not as a fundamental human right within the realms of the European Community. However, in this case, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) and the European Commission (the Commission) considering the "nature" of the freedom at risk reviewed Kremzow's case
stating that Kremzow should have been allowed to defend himself pursuant to Article 6(3)(c) of the Convention.18 The ECHR held that "Article 6 of the Convention had been violated," and Kremzow was entitled
to monetary damages for legal fees and expenses. 19
Following the ECHR judgment, Kremzow again found himself in
the Austrian civil courts. This time in his appeal he requested the
resolution of three issues: (1) a reduction in his sentence pursuant to
paragraph 410 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; (2) the
payment of damages pursuant to Article 5(5) of the Convention for his

14. Case C-299195 Kremzow v. Republik Osterreich, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 1289, at para.
3 (1997) [hereinafter Kremzow].
15. Id., 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640, at para. 4.
16. Id. at para. 5.
17. Id. at 2642, para. 11-12.
18. Id. at 2640-42, para. 6. See also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(3)(c), 312 U.N.T.S. 221
(1950) [hereinafter the Convention]. Kremzow v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A), no. 268 B
(1993).
19. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640-42, at para. 6..
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unlawful detention; and (3) the Court's recognition of the fact that the
Articles of the Convention are directly applicable under Austrian law
and give rise to a legitimate claim for infringement on his right to liberty of person. 20 The Austrian court rejected Kremzow's claims pursuant to paragraph 2(3) of the Austrian Law on State Liability, which contradicted the articles of the Convention, 21 thereby holding Austrian law
above Community law.
Kremzow next appealed to the Austrian Supreme Court. He argued that although the ECHR had determined that the State had violated Kremzow's rights under the Convention, the Courts had failed to
rectify these violations. 22 Kremzow beseeched the Court to reference
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on two main questions: (1) are all or at
least the substantive law provisions of the Convention, including the
provisions of Articles 5, 6, and 53 of the Convention which are relevant
to the proceeding before the Supreme Court, part of Community law
(Article 164 of the EC Treaty), with the result that the ECJ may give a
preliminary ruling on their interpretation pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 177 of the EC Treaty;23 and (2) if the first question was
answered in the affirmative, there was an inquiry as to whether national courts are bound by ECHR decisions under particular circumstances pursuant to Articles 5 and 6.24
Kremzow justified ECJ jurisdiction over this case based on the argument that because he is a citizen of the European Community, he is
entitled to the right to freedom of movement for persons, as articulated
in Article 8, section (a) of the EC Treaty. 25 Further, he stated that because any citizen is entitled to move freely between the Member States
without any specific intention to reside, "a State which infringes that
fundamental right, guaranteed by Community law, by executing an
unlawful penalty of imprisonment must be held liable in damages by
26
virtue of Community law."
The ECJ ultimately held that it did not have jurisdiction because
the legislation in question was outside the scope of Community law.
The Court said:
[w]here national legislation is concerned with a situation
which, as in the case at issue in the main proceedings, does

20. Id. at 2641, at para. 7.
21. Id. at 2641-42, at para. 9.
22. Id. at 2642, at para. 11.
23. Id. at 2642-43, at para. 12(1)-(2).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2644, para. 13. Article 8(a) of the EC Treaty states: "[e]very citizen of the
Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member
States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the
measures adopted to give it effect." EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 8a.
26. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2644, at para. 13.
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not fall within the field of application of Community law, the
Court cannot, in a reference for a preliminary ruling, give the
interpretive guidance necessary for the national court to determine whether that national legislation is in conformity
with the fundamental rights whose observance the Court ensures, such as those deriving in particular from the Conven27
tion.
The ECJ based its holding on the fact that its interpretation of the
provision, regarding the freedom of movement of persons found in the
EC Treaty, was not consistent with Kremzow's interpretation. 28 Thus,
although the deprivation of liberty prevents a person from exercising
freedom of movement, the Court did not find a sufficient connection
with Community law to justify the application of Community provisions. 29 The ECJ reiterated that the Austrian Court had sentenced
Kremzow for murder and the illegal possession of a firearm under Austrian national law. 30 The ECJ went on to establish that Austria had
never intended Community law to address the national law in question. 31 Therefore, according to the Court, the national legislation in this
32
case dealt with a situation outside the scope of Community law.
Although several European States agreed to membership in the
EC, the States wanted to ensure the preservation of individual sovereignty. The unification process, which commenced after World War II,
was the result of European State's "desire for economic and political
unity and stability."33 However, in order to progress without a loss of
rights, Member States agreed to institutions such as the ECJ to maintain the framework of the Community.3 4 The States continued to restrict the power of the Community through limitations on Community
law. Thus, although Community law was supreme over national law,
"the European Community [was] a system of limited competences.
Member States approve the transfer of competences to a central institu35
tion," thereby creating an internal limitation on the Community.
In effect, the Member States attempted to secure their sovereignty
through the guarantee that the Community would never have too much
power, since the individual States were the ones supplying the Community with its power. Thus, States left many laws, including criminal
laws under national legislation, thereby creating an area of law under

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 2645, at para 15.
Id. at para. 16.
Id. at para. 13.
Id. at 2646, at para. 17.
Id.
Id. at para. 18.
See Stever, supra note 2, at 931.
See id. at 935.
Id. at 941-42.
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which the ECJ was not meant to accept jurisdiction. In the case at
hand, Kremzow's violations were ones that the Member States never intended the Community to deal with, and thus fell out of the scope of
ECJ jurisdiction. What the Member States failed to realize was that although many laws would fall under national law, there was an entire
body of human rights violations, which (1) protected citizens of the
Community as a whole, (2) superseded national law, and (3) gave the
ECJ the necessary jurisdiction to hear the case. Thus, Kremzow's unlawful detainment justified the request to the ECJ to hear his case, and
the ECJ legitimately had jurisdiction over the case.
III. ANALYSIS OF PRIOR LEGAL AUTHORITY

In Kremzow, the ECJ stated it has consistently held that "fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principle of Community law whose observance the Court ensures."36 This principle was
first espoused in 1969, through Stauder in which the Court considered
the regulation of butter within the Community. 37 Council Regulation
804/68 allowed Member States to provide cheap butter to those who required governmental assistance. 38 In order to control the amount of
butter the Member States could provide to its residents, the regulation
required that "[t]he Member States shall adopt all the measures necessary to ensure that... the beneficiaries of the measures only obtain
butter in return for a coupon issued in their name." 39 Stauder, a resident of Ulm, felt that it was "discriminatory to require the beneficiaries
to reveal their name and address to the retailer."40 Stauder argued that
requiring an individual's name on a coupon breached the basic rights
laid down in the German Constitution. 41 The Stauder case led the
Court to explore the role of the individual within the Community for the
first time. The ECJ established that it must ensure the observance of
"the fundamental rights of the individual contained in the general principles of the law of the Community."42 The Court based this determination "on the very general provision of Article 164 of the EC Treaty,
which requires the Court to 'ensure that in the interpretation and application of [the] Treaty the law is observed."' 43 Stauder was the first

36. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. 2644, at para. 14.
37. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 415, [1969] 9 C.M.L.R. 112, 113
(1970) [hereinafter Stauderl.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 113.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 119.
43. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, The Protectionof Human Rights in the European Union:
Overview and Bibliography, 22 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 228, 231 (1994). See also EC
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573

case to emphasize that "the law" did not focus merely on the economic
and political aspects of the Community; it also included the "fundamental rights of the individual."44 Since Stauder, the Court has incorporated this reasoning in several cases, exhibiting an apparent commit45
ment to protecting individual fundamental freedoms.
The problem with the Stauder decision is that it is not explicit in
defining what rights were considered fundamental rights. In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhrund Vorratstelle fr. Gertreide und Futtermittel,46 the Court attempted to create a more succinct
description of what the term "fundamental freedoms" included. The
Court stated that the "protection of basic rights is inspired by the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, but must, nevertheless, be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community." 47 In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, a
German Administrative Court wanted to override Community regulations because they were inconsistent with the German basic law. 48 Although the Court emphasized the supremacy of Community law, it went
on to say, that "respect for basic rights forms an integral part of that
law."49

In order to ensure these basic rights, the Court in Nold v. Commission stated that along with common constitutional traditions among the
Member States, it drew inspiration from international treaties for the
protection of human rights on which the Member States had collaborated or of which they were signatories.50 As Jean-Marie Henckaerts
observes, after the Nold decision, there was an "increasing reliance on
international treaties, more specifically the Convention. Rather than to
commence with a comparative constitutional study on each case, the
Court made use of an existing catalogue of human rights that all Mem51
ber States had already agreed upon, namely the Convention." '
The most significant aspect of the Nold decision was the standard it
set for future ECJ decisions regarding the role of human rights within
the Community setting. Nold suggested that the Community's position

TREATY, supra note 7, art. 164.
44. Id.

45. See generally Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhrund
Vorratstelle fr. Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, [19701 11 C.M.L.R. 255,
(1972) (emphasizing the supremacy of Community law); Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen-und
BaustoffgroBhandlung v. Commission of the European Communities, 1974 E.C.R. 491,
[1974] 14 C.M.L.R. 338 (1974) [hereinafter Nold] (discussing the rights of the individual
within the Community).
46 InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft,11 C.M.L.R. at 283, para. 4.
47. Id. at 257-58.
48. Id.
49. Henckaertes, supranote 43, at 232-33.
50. Nold, 14 C.M.L.R. at 354.
51. Henckaertes, supra note 43, at 232.
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on human rights issues was actually grounded in individual Member
States.5 2 Member States created the basis for the Community's position
on human rights issues through adherence to treaties and constitutions
as well as numerous Member States' recognition of the Convention. Because 'human rights' was now a "Community" issue, Nold laid the foundation for future decisions, despite the lack of stare decisis in ECJ decisions.
One such case, relying on Nold, was Elliniki Radiophonia
Tileorassi v. Dimotiki Etairia.53 In this case, the Thessaloniki Regional
Court asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of
several provisions of the EEC Treaty and the Convention "in order to
determine the compatibility with these provisions of a national system
of exclusive television rights."5 4 The Court, referring to one of its past
decisions,5 5 held that the Convention, which was created to "promote
greater cooperation and understanding of common human rights between European States",5 6 "has special significance." 57 For this reason,
"the Community cannot accept measures which are incompatible with
observance of the human rights thus recognized and guaranteed." 58 Although the Court in Elliniki advocated Community concord through a
general acceptance of Community law, the Court's position in Kremzow
still gives a great deal of deference to the national laws of individual
Member States.
The ECJ's deference to individual Member States' laws is very clear
in Kremzow's holding. The Kremzow court stated that it had no jurisdiction concerning "national legislation lying outside the scope of Community law."5 9 In making this determination, the Court referred to Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland (Society), in which
the Court determined that the question of abortion fell within the parameters of the health, welfare and safety of State citizens, protected by
State law. 60 In Society, the ECJ stated the circumstances giving rise to
ECJ jurisdiction. The Court held that "where the [national] rules do fall
within the scope of Community law, the Court must provide guidance
through a preliminary ruling, in making interpretations to whether the

52. See generally, Nold, 14 C.M.L.R 338.
53. Case C-260189, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia
Syllogon Prossopikouv. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos
Avedellas and others, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925, [hereinafter Ellinikil.
54. Id. at para. 1.
55. See Case C-222184, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1986] E.C.R. 1651, 1986 3 C.M.L.R. 240 (1986).
56. Stever, supra note 2,at 949.
57. Elliniki, 1991 E.C.R. at para. 41.
58. Id.
59. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, at para. 15.
60. See Case C-159/90, The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, 1990
E.C.R. 1-4685, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991).
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rules are compatible with the fundamental rights ensured by the
Court's interpretation of the Convention." 6' In Kremzow, the national
law in question regarded Kremzow's sentence for murder and the illegal
possession of a firearm which the Court concluded were "provisions of
national law which were not designed to secure compliance with rules of
Community law." 62 The Court justified its lack of jurisdiction on the
premise that the national legislation in the Kremzow case related "to a
situation, which [did] not fall within the field of application of Community law." 63 The Court also failed to recognize Kremzow's absence from
64
the sentencing as a deprivation of his liberty.
The Court, referring to Moser stated that "[w]hilst any deprivation
of liberty may impede the person concerned from exercising his right to
free movement ... a purely hypothetical prospect of exercising that
right does not establish a sufficient connection with Community law to
justify the application of Community provisions. 65 The case to which
the Court analogized was one in which Moser, a German national was
denied the right to "undertake the post-graduate training necessary to
secure entry... to the post of a teacher ... "66 The National Court
asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling as to whether the defendant's
"legislation was compatible with the principle of free movement of
workers contained in Article 48 of the Treaty."67 The Court's reference
to the Moser holding was inaccurate. The distinction between the two
cases was that in Moser, the fact that Moser had not attempted to find a
job in another Member State, but was merely raising the issue, created
the "hypothetical situation." In Moser, the Court actually refers to "[a]
purely hypothetical prospect of employment in another Member

State ....

"68

On the other hand, in Kremzow, the ECJ did not have to create a
hypothetical situation to "justify the application of Community provisions." 69 Article 6 section 3(c) of the Convention explicitly states
"[e]veryone charged with a criminal offense has the following minimum
rights: to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing. ... "70 When the Supreme Court altered Kremzow's sen-

61. Id. at 892, at para. 31.
62. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2646, at para.17.
63. Id. at para. 18.
64. Id. at para. 19.
65. Id. at 2645, at para. 16, citing Case 180/83, Hans Moser V. Land Baden Wurttemberg, 1984 E.C.R. 2539, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 720 (1984) [hereinafter Moser].
66. Id. at para. 2.
67. Id. at 725, para. 4. See also EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 48.
68. Moser, 3 C.M.L.R. at 728, at para. 18.
69. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, at para. 16.
70. Article 6(3)(c) states: "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights:...(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free
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tence, he was not present at the hearing. This lack of representation
was a blatant violation of the Convention. Article 5 of the Convention
states that "[e]very person has the right to liberty and security of person." 71 However, where one "has been the victim of arrest and detention in contravention of provisions of this Article shall have an enforce72
able right to compensation."
Although the national legislation in question dealt with murder, a
crime not covered under Community law, the procedures regarding detention within individual Member States must comply with the Community law. Again, in Kremzow, the Court erroneously referred to past
case law in the Maurin decision. 73 In this case, Mr. Maurin, a French
national charged with selling food products after their expiry date, argued a violation of the Convention "concerning observance of the rights
of the defence and of the adversarial nature of proceedings." 74 The
French government, the United Kingdom, and the Commission argued
that the ECJ lacked jurisdiction because "the national legislation falls
outside the scope of Community law... [and] the national court has not
cited any provision of Community law and therefore does not raise any
75
issue concerning the interpretation or validity of Community law."
The ECJ held that "[t]he Court does not have jurisdiction to determine
whether procedural rules applicable to offenses under national legislation which falls outside the scope of Community law may be in breach of
the principles concerning observance of the rights of the defense and of
76
the adversarial nature of proceedings."
Again, the distinction between Maurin and Kremzow is that Community law makes no explicit provisions regarding procedural issues
77
dealing with the "defense and adversarial nature of proceedings."
However, the Community law does make express provisions for procedural issues regarding detention. Thus, the sentencing of Kremzow,
while a purely procedural issue, clearly falls under the provisions of
Community law and should have provided the ECJ with the necessary
justification for jurisdiction.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE KREMZOw DECISION

For the past thirty years, the ECJ has claimed to put fundamental
rights at the forefront of its decision-making-"an integral part of the
when the interests of justice so require ...." The Convention, supra note 18, art. 6(3)(c).
71. The Convention, supra note 18, art. 5.
72. Id.
73. See generally Case C-144/95, Criminal Proceedings Against Jean-Louis Maurin,
1996 E.C.R. 1-2909.
74. Id. at para. 12.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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general principle of Community law whose observance the Court ensures."78 Yet, the very foundation of the EC was purely economic, to
create a stronger and more unified Europe to compete in a global economy.7 9 As Linda Hantrais points out, "only twelve of the 248 articles of
the EC Treaty were devoted explicitly to social policy." 80 At what point
did human rights become a central issue within a "community" created
for economic stability? This is a very important question for it helps one
to determine the efficacy of current human rights regimes in the EC.
In order for human rights laws to have any effect within the Community, each Member State must ensure uniform enforcement of the
laws. As the ECJ has stated in the past, every national court must, in a
case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and
protect rights, which the latter confers on individuals.8 ' Accordingly, the
national courts must set aside any provision of national law, which may
conflict with Community law, whether prior, or subsequent to the
Community rule.8 2 However, when the issue is one of fundamental
rights, an area where States do not always agree, often they will turn to
the ECJ and the ECHR for guidance.
The EC Treaty established the ECJ, which from the beginning had
very limited international jurisdiction over cases dealing with disputes
between Member States of the EC.83 Since its inception, the number of
cases over which the ECJ presided has increased steadily, providing the
Court with the "domestic enforcement mechanisms for its judgments." 4
Scholars consider the ECJ's effectiveness in regards to its adjudication
of Article 177 cases.8 5 However, compliance with ECJ decisions has
been inconsistent and has forced the ECJ to turn to private parties and
domestic courts and hold that "a [S]tate that fail[s] to implement a
Community directive could be required to pay compensation to injured
6
private parties."8
The ECHR interprets the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 87 Although originally
only a few countries outside of Western Europe ratified the Convention,
"as of 1997 forty nations from Iceland to Russia have signed on to the

78. Stauder, 9 C.M.L.R. at 119.
79. Linda Hantrais, Social Policy in the European Union 2 (1995).
80. Id. at 2.
81. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, 1978
E.C.R. 629, [1978] 23 C.M.L.R. 263, 283-84 (1978).
82. Id.
83. See Laurence Helfer, Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication,
107 YALE L.J. 273, 290 (1997).
84. Id.
85. See id. at 292.
86. Id. at 293.
87. Id.
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treaty and one or more of its various protocols."8 8 The problem here,
similar to the problem with the ECJ, deals with enforcement of the
rulings. Despite the fact that all of the parties to the EC Treaty "undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are
parties,"8 9 the adherence to the judgment varies a great deal. 90 Only
half of the signatories to the Convention have incorporated the EC
Treaty into domestic law.91 While this allows these particular Member
States' nationals to invoke the EC Treaty and partake of its benefits,
the other half of the countries have not made the treaty a part of domestic law, and thus, once again citizens are left to deal with the Member States' inconsistencies in enforcing the Court's rulings.
Both of these courts have many similarities and differences. On the
one hand, both are "supranational courts with no direct means of enforcing their judgments and thus are apparently dependent on the
goodwill of national governmental institutions."92 On the other hand,
however, whereas the ECJ "interacts with national courts in a kind of
partnership based on distinct but complementary spheres of jurisdiction.., the ECHR is more likely to be in the position of reviewing the
handiwork of national courts in a more traditional hierarchical relationship."93 Thus, although the ECHR is more narrowly tailored to human
rights issues, it seems that ECJ's direct interaction with individual
Member States might be more successful at attaining a uniform means
of dealing with these issues within the Community.
One should recognize that over the years the ECJ has had an immense influence over the formulation of European human rights law.
As discussed earlier in the note, ECJ cases such as Nold and Stauder,
have assisted in the development of Community human rights law. As
Vincent Power asserts, ECJ decisions have done more to aid the progression of Community law "than the actions of the Council of Ministers
94
and the Commission or the aspirations of the European Parliament."
Although the creation of the ECHR was for the purpose of protecting
the fundamental rights of EC members, one must consider the lack of
enforceability on the part of the ECHR. Without any mechanism for enforcing its decisions, it seems that the judgments of the ECHR are valueless, unless Member States voluntarily adhere to the decisions. One
should think of the ECHR as a "work in progress." The concept of a
court, which deals primarily with human rights issues, is admirable;
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however, unless and until the Community takes a different approach to
implementing and enforcing decisions, the ECHR continues to encounter many obstacles.
In such progressive times, one must consider whether the ECHR is
up to the task of meeting the needs of all its citizens. For example, consider the fact that the Preamble to the Convention refers to "countries
with a similar tradition." 95 At the inception of the Convention, countries with "similar traditions" referred exclusively to Western European
Countries. 96 How will Eastern European countries fare under this system? Brian Walsh argues that many scholars believe that "Eastern
European countries will liberally interpret human rights, and that
these countries desire to conform to what they believe is the requirement of natural law." 97 It is true that if a country wants to become a
Member State, it is likely to agree to any terms the Community sets
forth. However, as history has demonstrated with other human rights
institutions, agreeing to adhere to the law and actual adherence, are
two completely different issues.
Proponents of the ECHR would probably argue that whether it is
the ECHR or the ECJ, both have to interpret the Convention. Thus,
why not allow an institution which focuses primarily on human rights
to interpret a document pertaining to human rights? The answer is
simple. While the ECJ would interpret the same laws as the ECHR, the
ECJ, central to the functioning of the Community as a whole, would
have a more direct influence upon the individual Member States. One
must accept that although social policy is gaining momentum within the
Community, "there is little concrete evidence that European social policy is perceived by the Council as other than a handmaiden to economic
objectives."98 Whereas Member States have recognized a reciprocal relationship between economic and social policy, the concurrence seems to
support the notion that "[a] good economic policy may be a major requisite for an efficient and adequate social policy, but a good social policy
can be a powerful support for a good economic policy." 99 This type of
thinking clearly indicates that despite the Community's progress in areas of social policy, and more specifically human rights, the underlying
foundation continues to focus on economic policy.
Another aspect of the argument focuses on the premise that because the Member States created the ECJ for the purpose of promoting
the Community's goals, the ECJ is more likely than the ECHR to gain
compliance from the Member States. Additionally, because the law as
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the Member States set forth and agree upon limits the ECJ, it can never
have any real power. Thus, if it oversteps its boundaries, the Member
States will systematically withdraw from the Community and its laws.
This is not the case. One must keep in mind the economic purpose of
the EC. This being the case, Member States want to see the Community prosper as a whole, as this would allow each individual State to
flourish as well. The desire of individual Member States to achieve the
most stable and prosperous economic setting is enough of an incentive
for the States to ensure the prosperity of the Community as a whole. It
is important to note that the ECJ is willing to respect the Constitutions
of individual Member States, declaring in the Nold decision that "it
cannot therefore uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the Constitutions of those
States."'100 Although the ECJ accepts State sovereignty to an extent, it
also recognizes that too much deference could be detrimental to the
Community as a whole. For this reason the Court has stated that "special criteria for assessment stemming from the legislation or constitutional law of a particular member State would, by damaging the substantive unity and efficacy of Community law, inevitably lead to the
destruction of the unity of the Common Market and the jeopardizing of
the cohesion of the Community."'' 1
Member States have not put as much time and effort to create a
stronger and more unified Europe, only to see it fall as a result of individual States failing to comply with Community law. It is this prevailing attitude that Member States have demonstrated that gives the ECJ
the capability to enforce its decisions. The situation in the EC is much
like that of the United States. The power of Member States to restrict
the ECJ is comparable to the system of checks and balances in the
United States. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, which has an
express bill of rights, some scholars argue that it is impossible for the
ECJ to uphold fundamental rights as the EC does not contain a bill of
rights at all.10 2 However, although the United States Constitution contains a bill of rights, there is still disagreement as to what constitutes a
fundamental right. 10 3 Whereas fundamental rights in the United States
often appear abstract and difficult to uphold, the ECJ through the
Stauder decision "confirmed that human rights were enshrined in the
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general principles of EEC law and were enforceable by the ECJ."104 As
one scholar notes,
[tihe ECJ is now using human rights not only to defend the
supremacy of Community law but also to extend the jurisdiction of the ECJ. In finding that Community law was superior to national law, the ECJ had to fill the gap of national
protection of human rights by finding some means of Com105
munity based protection.
V. CONCLUSION

The implication of the Kremzow decision is crucial to the sustenance of the Community. It is unlikely that the current regimes are
sufficient for the simple reason that the underlying foundation of the
Community is economic-that is to say that there are many inconsistencies among the States when it comes to human rights laws. Thus,
individual fundamental rights are not the unifying force of the Community. For this reason, it would seem that until all of the individual
Member States consistently adhere to the human rights regimes, most
notably the ECHR, the ECJ must assume jurisdiction over cases dealing
with individual fundamental rights. In taking on such cases, the ECJ
would not be usurping the ECHR's authority, but rather it would be fulfilling its obligation of ensuring that these rights are enforced for the
individuals of the Community until more consistency is created among
the Member States. By failing to assume jurisdiction to guide individual Member States in interpreting the conformity of national laws to
Community laws in the Kremzow case, the ECJ failed to ensure the
fundamental freedoms of European Union citizens that it guaranteed to
protect.
Despite the fact that the Community chose to narrowly tailor the
ECHR to deal with human rights issues, its lack of enforcement ability
is a significant hindrance. Although proponents of the ECHR argue
that it has had an impact on Community laws, one must keep in mind
that the decisions are not binding on any State, and thus, aside from
the goodwill of each State, there is little incentive to comply. On the
other hand, the ECJ is more central to the actual functioning of the EC.
The underlying principles in the creation of the EC were primarily economic, and the ECJ was supposed to promote the goals that Member
States had set forth for the Community as a whole. This being the case,
individual States, while wanting to preserve their sovereignty, recognize that if the Community as a whole is to prosper, compliance with
the ECJ's decisions is necessary.
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The ECJ is willing to respect the Constitutions of individual States,
however, it is in the position to give limited deference to the States for
the simple reason that States want to maintain Community cohesion.
Much like the system of checks and balances in the United States, each
institution has the ability to ensure the prosperity of the Community,
while protecting the individual rights of its citizens. As Jeremy Bentham once stated, "[r]ights are the fruits of the law and of the law alone;
there are no rights without the law-no rights contrary to law-no
rights anterior to law."'10 6 If the EC wants to protect the rights of its
people, it is imperative that it allows the ECJ to assume jurisdiction until the Community attains more uniformity regarding the observance of
human rights laws. If not, individuals and States will continue to violate fundamental rights without fear of consequences or castigation.
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